

# The State, Security, and Intervention beyond West Africa: examining the arc of instability and conflict on the continent of Africa

**Gani Joses Yoroms**

Professor of Political Science and Strategic Studies, National Defence College Nigeria.  
Visiting Professor at Nile University of Nigeria; Abuja and Bingham University, Karu, Nigeria

Corresponding author: Gani Joses Yoroms (fauthor@university.edu.au, www.fauthor.com).

**ABSTRACT** Considering the tense moments of crises and conflicts which West Africa went through before the end of the Cold War, it was least expected that the post-cold-war era would unleash another moment of crisis—one that would be even more devastating to the entire continent. However, the end of the Cold War, and the events at the aftermath of 9/11, saw not only West Africa, but the entire African continent, immersed in a series of ongoing critical security paradoxes. This paper attempts to contribute to, and build upon, the insights of a key expert, Emmanuel Aning Kwesi, on the West Africa security conundrum as enunciated in the publication, “West Africa Security Perspectives: Kwesi Aning Explains,” published by the Danish Institute for International Studies. Emanuel Kwesi Aning, a Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Ghana, was tasked to explain how the West African sub-region found itself smeared by critical security scenarios. Aning, in his discourse, focused on eight critical security challenges in the sub-region, including the weak nature of the state, the rise and existence of organised crime, illegal mining, climate change, demography and urbanization, armed robbery at sea and piracy, security, and intervention. This paper continues the dialogue with Kwesi Aning by summarizing the eight critical security paradoxes into three major areas: the character of the state, the nature of security, and the necessity for external intervention. This paper also goes beyond the West African scenario in which Professor Kwesi Aning situated his discourse and submits that this challenge is not only for West Africa, but for the entire continent.

**INDEX TERMS** The state, security, intervention, colonialism, regime security, human security, national security

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The western subcontinent of Africa has been on the front burner of international conversation since the dawn of the post-cold-war era. Early discussions were replete with all kinds of security threats, conflicts and criminalities that made Robert Kaplan [1] to foresee a “coming anarchy.” Whether the anarchy has now come and gone, or whether we are still grappling with it, remains a serious challenge that scholars, policy makers and seurocrats are struggling to deconstruct. It is in this respect that the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) engaged Professor Emmanuel Kwesi Aning in a conversation which has led to the publication of West Africa Security Perspectives: Kwesi Aning Explains [2]. In this report, Kwesi Aning discusses eight security paradoxes which are critically important for the continent of Africa. These critical security paradoxes entail: the nature of the state in West Africa, the rise of organised crime, illegal mining,

climate change, demography and urbanization, armed robbery at sea and piracy, security, and intervention. In the wake of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the impact of these eight security paradoxes upon the development of African nations is more important than ever, especially in regions such as the North African Sahel. As President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria attests,

The Sahel remains vulnerable to Boko Haram, 20 years after its formation and other radical groups. Somalia is in its second decade fighting the equally extreme al-Shabaab. Many African nations are submerged under the weight of insurgency. As for Africa we are faced with our days of reckoning just as in some sense the West is losing its will for the fight in Afghanistan and the Middle East [3].

Kwesi Aning and other scholars, like Ebo Hutchful, Funmi Olanisakin, Ebo Adedeji, Osman Gbla, Yusuf Bangura, Okello Oculi, Rocky Williams, Amadu Sesay and Jackie Cilliers, have deftly analyzed the challenges of security sector reform and governance in Africa, and it is hoped that African policy makers and securocrats will make use of their findings.

This paper builds on the rich conversation provided by Kwesi Aning and the related literature on instability and conflicts in Africa. It deepens the discussion from four angles: First, what is the nature of the State in (West) Africa, and how does it connect to the Sahel-Sahara in terms of the character of those who govern (that is, the elites)? Second, how does the governance process affect the security context on the “arc of instability and conflict” in Africa? Third, no discussion on West Africa is complete without understanding the developments that are taking place on the arc of instability in Africa. The arc, spanning from the West to the Eastern Flank of the continent, is inextricably linked to complex, multi-dimensional security emergencies, some of which even lie beyond the eight critical security paradoxes that Kwesi Aning outlines. Lastly, the paper reinforces Kwesi Aning’s exhortation that the wobbling nature of the state, lacking the capacity to effectively function because of its fragility, has implications for security governance.

The paper thus addresses an amalgam of the issues in Kwesi Aning’s conversation. In accomplishing this, it links the concept of the state to a particular region’s security or insecurity, and discusses the necessity for intervention in West Africa beyond the geopolitical location of the 15 member states of ECOWAS. The arc of instability stretches from West Africa through the Sahel-Sahara axis down to the Horn of Africa, as well as the Eastern part of Africa, shaping the challenges of insecurity and providing the basis for foreign intervention on the continent.

## 2. BACKGROUND

### 2.1 THE NATURE OF THE STATE IN AFRICA

The African state<sup>1</sup> has evolved from its pre-colonial nature through colonial subjugation, metamorphosing into Two Publics [2] and what Ekeh [4] later called a “migrated structure,” that is disembodied of its original structure as it were in western civilisation.<sup>2</sup> Although the new structure of the state which emerged after independence was welcomed with great euphoria among Africans, the elite that took over

were, unfortunately, ill-prepared to govern [2, p. 13]. Democratic elections ushered numerous civil-society leaders into political offices. However, the promises of democracy and prosperity quickly turned into disappointment [2, p. 12]. The leadership fell into corruption as the state became, not only fragile, but in danger of collapse, unable to control the rise of arms proliferation, terrorism and insurgency, drug trafficking, human trafficking, organised crime, maritime insecurity, corruption, and weak economic growth. All these challenges heightened insecurity in West Africa by deepening conflicts in various dimensions, creating endemic economic crises and weakening the power of the state to assert itself. It is in this light that Kwesi Aning has alluded to the relevance of traditional institutions to help keep the state afloat, in spite of the damage done to these institutions by colonialism. However, there are multiple challenges when it comes to the African traditional institution. Politicians have often exploited traditional rulers in Africa; winning elections with their support, but abandoning them immediately upon gaining power. In Nigeria, for instance, there is no constitutional role for the traditional institution and traditional rulers can be removed from office at will by the political ruling class. In many places, traditional rulers are no longer the revered custodians of the peoples’ traditions and culture as they were in the pre-colonial era. The most recent case in Nigeria was the dethronement of the Emir of Kano, Lamido Sanusi Lamido, in 2020 by Governor Abdullahi Ganduje of Kano State. Given the decline of traditional institutions, whether by political machinations or through loss of influence over the people, Kwesi Aning’s statement regarding their relevance is therefore open to debate.

Perhaps a more recent force in African society today exists within civil society groups. These too, however, are not without challenges, as they are often funded by groups outside of the continent, and therefore subject to external influence, making it possible for the state to question the legitimacy and validity of their criticisms. The recent case where the Nigerian state banned Twitter on the basis of its influence on civil society groups to oppose government is a case in point. The Nigerian government attributed the strength of #EndSARS protests and the rise of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) to the role of social media, especially Twitter.

The perceived illegitimacy of civil society groups, the waning influence of traditional rulers, and the ill-governance of new political leaders, all contribute to our understanding of the nature of the African state. It follows that the state in Africa continues to demonstrate itself as:

- a migrated social structure; lacking the character and capacity of its original (European) structure to function in a way to defend and protect its people;
- weak, with compromised ruling elites or leadership who lack the capacity and necessary skills to govern;

<sup>1</sup> The concept of the state, as used here, is generic. However, the functionality and performance of the state differ from one political environment to another. The state in Europe, for instance, functions differently from the state in Africa. This has to do with the historical development that led to the emergence of the state in each of the political climates.

<sup>2</sup> In defining the African state as a “migrated social structure,” the late Professor Peter Ekeh of State University of New York at Buffalo explained that the state that emerged from Africa was not the same as the state in Europe. According to him, the social formations that made up the African state were transported and imposed on Africa, hence they are ‘migrated social structure.’ Such constructs as democracy and the rule of law; establishments like bureaucracy and elected parliaments and many more, were disembodied of their original context and parceled to Africa and form the core of the resultant migrated social structure [4, p. 10].

- subject to external influence by means of both hard and soft powers tending to weaken the capacity of state institutions to enforce the rule of law;
- exhibiting menacing dimension of cleavages with deep diversities whose perception of security is defined in opposition to that of the state.

The challenges of state and leadership outlined above imply that the state in Africa must now confront, and learn how to cope with:

- a crisis of self-determination as being experienced in the Cameroun (the Ambazonia separatists), Nigeria (Independent People of Biafra (IPOB), and Ethiopia (Tigray region);
- the rise of Covid-19 that has brought about the dramatization of human rights to the detriment of health security, sparking protests and passive resistance to the state in Tunisia, Nigeria, and South Africa, among others;
- the resurgence of military coups (with Kwesi Aning predicting more coups in the region); already the West African region has experienced coups in Mali (twice), Guinea, and previously in Niger;
- the rise of insurgency and terrorism, and communal conflicts.

## 2.2 THE NATURE OF SECURITY IN AFRICA

In the light of the foregoing, the precarious nature of the African state tends to define what and how the nature of its security is constituted. The question then is, what becomes of security in Africa? Though the indices and components of the state are predominantly western in terms of its migrated structure, in many regions, it has lost its content and context. Instead, it is characterized by the emergence of what can be called the regime security state—a state which responds to the interests of the ruling elites rather than those of the people. As Kwesi Aning rightly stated:

There are fairly standard understandings of what the word security means, but it is in its application to improve and protect lives that the distortion appears. And it is that lacuna between what state institutions and its representatives perceive as security or insecurity and how they deliver or respond to it that often leads to misunderstanding and a sense of tension that, if not managed well, creates confrontations.  
[2, pp. 59-68]

In this context, security becomes distorted in many African nations to mean regime security rather than human security. The context of security becomes diversified as national security (Westphalian system), regime security (elite regime state) or human security (security of nationals/people's security). These three security predicaments have become

complex: their relevance has been largely overlooked, as has their impact on the livelihood of the citizens, along with their multiple implications for the stability of the state.

## 3. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

### 3.1 NATIONAL SECURITY

Perception and misunderstanding of national security by the political leadership provide the basis for subjective approach to security by the state. Thus, the state becomes excessively regimental and violent in response to popular opposition. The regimentation of security has the tendency to trigger multiple conflicts that could eventually incapacitate the legitimacy of the state and curtail its ability to function effectively. Originally the purpose of the state is not to threaten the population but to:

- defend the collective interest of the diverse populations
- provide good and democratic governance
- ensure security and rule of law
- sustain the welfare of the people and development of the state

However, the state in most African nations has fallen far short of this purpose, leaving their citizens short-changed and grossly ill-served.

### 3.2 REGIME SECURITY

The rise of regime security has come with all its oppressive tendencies. The African ruling elites have taken advantage of the porous nature of the migrated state structure in Africa to appropriate the security apparatus into regime security [5]. As a result, citizens' protests against these regime states has resulted in conflicts across the continent. In other words, security-regimes tend to undermine the legitimacy of the state and its ability to practicalise national security. Therefore, mounting pressure necessitates the shift of focus to security of nationals or human security a means to weaken the power of the regime state.

### 3.3 HUMAN SECURITY

The post-war period changed the perception and thinking of security, as focus shifted, with the rise of tyrannical regimes, from the Westphalian security state system to regime security state during the Cold War period. The failure of regime security state has necessitated what Okechukwu Ibeanu [6] called security of nationals in the post-cold-war period, commonly known as human security by the United Nations. Unlike national and regime security systems that are globally concerned with securing the boundaries of the state (focusing on threats to the capabilities of nations), and the elites in power respectively, human security is concerned with the responsibility of both the state and the international community to protect the people that are vulnerable to and providing opportunities to overcome these [6, p. 3]. Yet, as

Ibeanu has pointed out, even human security or security of nationals has failed to improve the social conditions of the people in many developing and developed states around the globe. There is ample evidence that global poverty has actually worsened, and even ‘rich countries’ have not fared well on the score of human security [6, p. 4]. Let’s look at these three security state predicaments and how they impact the people of Africa. Table 1 below helps to paint a picture of

African state, emerging from the fabrics of European imperialism (through the course of the slave trade, commercial capitalism, colonization of territories, deeply reflected on the fact that: by the European powers, and finally independence) is now inundated with European intervention projects. The history of intervention in Africa is rooted in a perceived inability of the African state to generate welfare goods for its people, as they (the people) are “left out of the spinoffs of economic growth from which only a narrow elite has benefitted, while they are left without alternative for survival” [7, p.73]. Created in a vacuum, the African state as a migrated social structure dispossesses its people from, or of, their identity, and leaves them void, without the means of self-determination. A complex security situation like this allows room for the rise of violent non-state actors. Kwesi Aning, rightly recollecting Robert Kaplan’s prescient paper on “The Coming Anarchy” [1] deeply reflected on the fact that:

Table 1. The three security predicaments.

WESTPHALIAN STATE: NATIONAL SECURITY (PRE-WORLD WAR I YEARS - 1914)	THE REGIME SECURITY STATE (POST WORLD WAR I AND THE COLD-WAR ERA)	THE STATE OF THE PEOPLE/SECURITY OF NATIONALS /HUMAN SECURITY (POST-COLD-WAR ERA)
Emphasis on national security	Emphasis on regime security	Emphasis on human security
Security defined primarily as defence of the nation-state	Security defined primarily as the protection of the leader/regime in office	Security defined primarily and foremost as human security
Emphasis on duties and obligations of nationals to the state	Emphasis on the responsibilities of the state and nationals to the regime	Emphasis on the responsibilities of the state to the people
Focus on threats to and capabilities of the nation-state	Focus on vulnerabilities and opportunities of the regime	Focus on vulnerabilities and responsibilities of the nationals
Wars and conflicts are principally Clausewitzian, involving only states	Wars were and remain principally to defend the interest of the regime in power	Wars and conflicts are identity-based, involving non-state actors challenging the state that denies them human security
Military formations emphasize sheer size and firepower of the state	Military formations emphasize elite security to defend the regime in power	Military formations emphasize small, mobile, integrated, and technologically-driven forces with less cost to the nationals

Source: Adapted and modified from Ibeanu [6, pp. 2-3].

the three security predicaments since the inauguration of the Westphalian state in 1848. The argument we are trying to make conceptually here, is that the persistence of conflict in Africa has gone beyond the level of human security assurances. If human security had been successful, conflicts on the continent would have been minimal. Instead, the perpetuation of instability and conflicts, either deliberately designed or by happenstance, has provided the basis for external forces, especially Euro-Americans, whose political and economic interests are at stake, to embark on African intervention projects.

**3.4 ARC OF INSTABILITY AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA: INTERVENTION BEYOND WEST AND SAHEL-SAHARA AFRICA**

As a result of the failure of the state to provide for and defend the interest of its people, there has been a resurgence of intervention in West Africa in recent decades. The

West Africa today is probably more unstable, and potentially more violent, with armed forces and security institutions that have been hollowed out over time, because politics has divested security personnel of their core mandate of keeping people safe. This is not just about demographics, but about the failure of governance processes that we see in Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Leaders in West Africa and the Sahel need to consider how to respond to what I perceive to be the potential social conflagration that could hit West Africa. That is one part of the intervention that we need to be looking at, one which will undermine our self-conception as it will question how we have used the independence period and pose the question of why we still cannot protect ourselves [2, p. 67].

Kwesi Aning’s identification of a potential conflagration is thrown in stark relief when one considers the extent and diversity of violent non-state extremism that is currently active in the arc of instability. Table 2 on the following page identifies the Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA) operating across the arc of instability beyond West Africa.

The Sahel-Saharan region, as political-economist Ronen Palan notes, is “anti-sovereign,” [7] or, as I prefer to see it, is ‘ungovernable space,’ rather than “ungoverned space” [7, p.3]. It is a region where a “sustained upsurge in the frequency of kidnappings, attacks, arrests and bombings...heightened by the activities of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has attracted major pull from Boko Haram and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), among other insurgents in West Africa” [8]. The Sahel-Saharan is not only a zone that breeds terrorism but also a booming axis where illegal business helps to fuel it. For instance, kidnaping alone fetched the AQIM \$70million in 2006, and a shipment to Europe of 600 kilogram of cocaine worth \$60 million in the same period [8, p. 48]. Among the about 28 known NVSAs, AQIM has become a growing monster on the continent.

**Table 2.** Violent non-State actors (terrorism/insurgency/liberation movement groups) in the African Arc of Instability and Conflict.

NETWORK	COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	IDEOLOGY
Allied Democratic Forces Islamic State in Central Africa	DR Congo	Political and Religious
Al Shabaab	Horn of Africa/East Africa	Political and Religious
Al Mourabitoun	Tunisia	Political and Religious
Ambazonia Movement	Cameroon	Political liberation movement
Ansar al Sharia	Libya	Political and Religious
Ansar al Sharia	Tunisia	Political and Religious
Ansar AL-Sannar (Soldiers of the Caliphate)	Mozambique	Political and Religious
Ansaroul Islam	Mali/Burkina Faso/Mauritania	Political and Religious
Ansar Dine	Mali	Political and Religious
AQIM	Sahel-Sahara/Maghreb	Political and Religious
AQIM Sahara	Sahel-Sahara (Chad, Niger, Algeria, Tunisia)	Political and Religious
Boko Haram	Nigeria, Lake Chad Region	Political and Religious
Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)	Nigeria	Political
Islamic Movement of Nigeria	Nigeria	Religious
Jamaat Nusrat al Islam Wal Muslem (JNIM)	Chad, Mali, Niger, Algeria, Tunisia	Political and religious
Katiba Serma	Sahel-Sahara (Mali, Chad, Niger, Algeria, Tunisia)	Political and religious
Katiba Salahadine	Sahel-Sahara (Chad, Mali, Niger, Algeria, Tunisia)	Political and Religious
Lord's Resistance Movement	Uganda, Ethiopia	Political
Macina Liberation Front (FLM)	Mali, B/Faso	Political and Religious
Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB)	Nigeria	Political
Macina Liberation Front (FLM)	Mali / Burkina Faso	Political and religious
MEND	Nigeria	Political and Economic
Morocco Islamist Combatant Group	Morocco	Political and Religious
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP)	Nigeria	Environmental
MUJAO	Mali	Political and Religious
Muslim Brotherhood	Egypt	Political and Religious
The Islamic State of Greater Maghreb (or Sahara)	Mali, B/Faso	Political and Religious
Tunisia Combatants	Tunisia	Political and Religious

The Sahel-Sahara region also has enormous resources that make the drive for foreign intervention critical for economic as well as political reasons. Apart from its colonial antecedents, which makes France foremost in the intervention project, the arc of instability and conflict While the region's colonial antecedents make France an obvious player in the intervention project, the global effects of violent activities within the arc of instability has caused both Europe and the USA to consider the implications of both intervention and non-intervention. The USA has shown considerable interest in the security situation of the Sahel-Sahara since 9/11. Prior to the formation of AFRICOM, the US had



**FIGURE 1.** Map of Africa showing the Arc of Instability and Conflict beyond West Africa. Source: Africa Defence Forum; USAFRICOM.

initiated in 2003, the Pan Sahel Initiative (later renamed ‘Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative’), with the aim of preventing the establishment of terrorist networks and extremist organisations in Africa. Under this initiative, the US envisaged a coalition of countries like Mali, Nigeria, Morocco, Niger, Mauritania, Chad, Algeria, Tunisia, Burkina Faso and Senegal. A sum of \$100m was budgeted from the Pentagon for a period of 5 years (to last up to 2010) intended, according to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Theresa Whelan, to address the worries of the US that “some of Africa’s vast and often sparsely-populated areas lack strong government control making it highly attractive to militants” [9, pp. 1-2]. The funds were meant to provide equipment and flintlock training activities for the armed forces of countries in the region. In spite of the funding and equipment, conflicts and terrorism still persist. Renamed the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), in 2021, it is being driven as Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS) under AFRICOM.

In 2013, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) expressed concern about the rising threats of insecurity and acknowledged that an arc of instability was stretching across Africa’s Sahara and Sahel region (see Figure 1). If left unchecked, it could transform the continent into a breeding ground for extremists and a launch pad for large scale terrorist attacks around the world (citation here). Indeed, much of Africa has become a new sanctuary of terrorism as extremist groups have moved from Afghanistan and Pakistan to the ungovernable (ungoverned) spaces in the Sahel and North Africa. And, since 2005, AQIM activities have attracted the interest of various terrorist groups, instigating heightened attacks ranging from West Africa to East Africa and through the Horn of Africa, including in Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania, and with recent developments in Uganda and Mozambique (see Figure 2 below on the number of terrorist attacks in Africa).




**FIGURE 2.** Map showing Number of Terrorist Attacks across Africa beyond West Africa. Source: Africa Defence Forum; USAFRICOM.

Sitting as the President of the UNSC, President Faure Gnassingbe of Togo maintained that:

If we don't give African governments the means to carry out an effective and sustainable counter terrorism strategy there is every reason to fear the creation of that terrorist arc from Mauritania to Nigeria and beyond the Horn of Africa [10].

The spread of extremist activities throughout the continent of Africa must be taken seriously if there is to be any hope of a secure state in Africa. Given the foregoing circumstance, the pertinent question, as Aning noted, should be what sort of intervention is needed in Africa. Unfortunately, regional organisations are growing weak as the graphic trend of militants on the continent increases (see Figure 3 below). ECOWAS appears incapable of containing the military intervention in Mali, while the Economic Community of East Central Africa States (ECCAS) and the African Union (AU) have not been entirely effective in upholding a democratic state. The AU was unable to suspend Chad from their organisation for allowing Derby's son, General Mahatma Derby, to take over the leadership of Chad after the death of his father, even though the Speaker of the Chadian Parliament was constitutionally appointed to replace the deceased. It does seem that democracy is ebbing in Africa.



**FIGURE 3.** Trends in Terrorists Attacks. Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project.

### 3.5 THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION IN AFRICA

In 1994, Robert Kaplan painted a gory picture of the West African subcontinent becoming:

the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and social stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real strategic danger, disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crimes, scarcity of resources, refugees, migrations, the increasing erosion of nation states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms and international drug cartels are now ... demonstrated through a West African prism [13, p.67].

Kaplan based his picture on observable trends in many countries in West Africa, including Sierra Leone, Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Ghana, where most of the primary rain forest and secondary bush were being destroyed. He warned that, although "Africa may be marginal in terms of conventional late-twentieth-century conceptions of strategy," nevertheless, "in an age of cultural and racial clash, when national defense is increasingly local, Africa's distress will exert a destabilizing influence on the United States [1] and, by implication, the European countries that are closer to Africa and the Maghreb. Nearly 30 years later, Kaplan's concerns warrant deeper investigation, from three interrelated dimensions: internal intervention, external intervention, and the complication of understanding how this intervention could explain or meet the purpose of stability of the state in (West) Africa.

### 3.6 INTERNAL INTERVENTION

Internal intervention must be addressed within the context of tackling conflict in a member state of either ECOWAS as a regional organisation or a member state assisting another state faced with security threats. The experiences in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea, and, later, The Gambia, among others, are glaring. Subsequent interventions in crisis-ridden countries like Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, and Burkina Faso, among others, were problematic. While Ghana found it not in its national interest to intervene in Cote d'Ivoire [2, p. 70]. Nigeria's assistance was not welcomed at all by the Gbagbo government. Similarly, in Mali the government preferred that Chad (a non-ECOWAS member), rather than Nigeria, send troops to assist with peacekeeping in 2012. The Force Commander that was appointed from Nigeria for AFISMA was left without a considerable liaison, as Malian government preferred to deal with France and Chadian Commanders. Though Kwesi Aning blamed this on "lack of appropriately sophisticated political leadership" [2, p.70] undoubtedly the lack of sufficient trust among member states in the subregion also contributed to the inevitable foreign intervention. The need for sophisticated leadership has been projected by Professor Ali Mazrui who, in his conversation on "African Triple Heritage" [11], maintains the need for a benign hegemon for West Africa.

Mazrui believed that by the 21st century, France's sphere of influence in West Africa would shrink as "its attention will be diverted to new challenges in Europe and Russia but also because younger French officials (would) lack the older generation's emotional ties to the ex-colonies" [1]. He further anticipated that "France will be too involved in European affairs that its sphere of influence will be filled by Nigeria—a more natural hegemonic power. ... It will be under those circumstances that Nigeria's own boundaries are likely to expand to incorporate the Republic of Niger (the Hausa link), the Republic of Benin (the Yoruba link) and conceivably Cameroon" [1]. Indeed, the expectation

that Nigeria would provide this leadership has been voided by several predictions based on deeply embedded internal contradictions of cleavages that are conflictual and the possibility that Nigeria itself was “likely to split into several pieces” [1] a prediction that was also made by the US Intelligence Council in 2005. Nigeria’s present security predicament has been presumed to be part of the prediction. This issue is discussed in further details below.

### 3.7 EXTERNAL INTERVENTION

External intervention from France, UK and their allies, especially the USA, has not only become inevitable but obvious, anchored on the fact that their economic and political interests are at stake. Meanwhile, recent developments have shown that from all indications, whatever interest France has in other parts of the world, young French policy officials have come to realize that France’s economic interest and indeed the security of Europe is tied to Africa. Kwesi Aning has spoken extensively on France’s intervention in West Africa, for reasons of colonial ties, economic and political interests. Based on its policy in Africa, France has discouraged efforts by African states to invest in collective security on the continent. Thus, as Kwesi Aning posits, intervention cannot be seen as a stability project. Rather, it is “meant to create an enabling environment for business and for businesses to move in.... Colonialism is an aggressive intervention... (but it) creates stable environments for business extraction (which) is not different from what is happening today” [2, p.71]. The independence granted in the 1960s to several African countries was not a ticket for autochthonous development. The integration of Africa has been difficult to achieve, as most of the agreements have remained ineffectual. For example, for over 20 years West Africa has been struggling to forge a common currency. This is yet to yield sufficient economic results because of the colonial divide brought about by Francophone and Anglophone politics within ECOWAS. Even with external intervention, the creation of a stable business environment is still unresolved, let alone a stable African state.

The stories of France’s interest in Africa which are trending in the media deserve consideration as they may throw more light on the complexities of intervention. First, President Chissano, one-time President of Mozambique and Chairman of the African Union (AU) in July 2003, publicly disagreed with a French Journalist who claimed that the African problem has to do more with African dictators like Mugabe than foreign control and intervention. President Chissano narrated how he got a mid-night phone call from the President of Benin, which he initially thought was about a coup that had taken place in Cotonou, being a hub of coup-making in Africa. But as it turned out, it was worse than a coup. What happened? The President of France had sent a special envoy to Cotonou to warn him to pay up the 10% fee owed France or else Benin would suffer severe

consequences. It should be noted that the 10% is one of the three agreements all Francophone countries signed with France as conditions for granting them independence in the 1960s. The three agreements were:

- all independent Francophone countries must adopt CFA as their common currency and it will be 100% controlled by France;
- all the independent Francophone countries are to pay 10% of their export earnings in exchange for France securing their sovereignty and security; and
- all the independent Francophone countries are to maintain 85% of their national reserves in Paris, France; and withdrawal can only be done with France’s approval; and where there is no approval but any country insists on the withdrawal it will be considered as a loan which will be paid back to France with interest.

Being faced with financial difficulty, Benin temporarily decided to withhold payment of any external loan including to France. France refused to take any excuse, so the President of Benin called the AU Chairman to mobilize member states to put pressure on France. Realizing that the French President Jacques Chirac would not listen to him or any other African leader, Chissano decided to call President Nelson Mandela (whom the western world revered) to intervene. Mandela himself was not just shocked, but enraged by this type of wicked agreement. He (Mandela) immediately called Jacques Chirac and told him this was worse than Apartheid. However, France waived Benin’s payment for that year but said if Benin failed to pay in the following year and beyond, it will suffer the consequences of not honouring a binding treaty. We all recall that at independence Guinea and Mali resisted this pact but at the end it was only Guinea that persisted against France. It suffered the consequences as France destroyed all it built in Guinea.

Dr Arikana Chihombori-Quao, the AU Ambassador to the United States, who took this anticolonial fight to an extreme was later eased out of her position for being too vocal against France. According to her allegations (also widely documented by others), which has never been denied by the government of France; the pact for continuation of colonization allows France to take \$500bn out of Africa every year, which is the biggest abuse of human rights, but the world is not talking against it. Some details may be found in [12, p. 1-20], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18]. Of late, Italy, faced with a flood of refugees, accused France of being the cause of Africa’s predicament and publicly threatened to ship the surging immigrants and refugees from Italy into France because the latter is getting away with the wealth and resources of Africa. It must be pointed out, however, that other western imperial powers

like Britain, US and Germany also have their own dark side of this story which space will not allow us to recount here.

### **3.8 THE EFFECT OF INTERVENTION ON THE STABILITY OF THE STATE**

Lastly, we need to interrogate the basis of intervention in Africa in the light of political interest from external powers. Africa's experience of external intervention has not always been beneficial to the state. The deceptive outcome of the intervention in Libya under UNSCR 1973, for instance, which deliberately led to a regime change (conducted by USA, France and Britain), sent shockwaves across Africa. This particular intervention project in Africa was motivated by economic, but also, and more fundamentally, political stimulus, and served to deepen dependency of the continent on the west. Unfortunately, the Libyan intervention has expanded the frontiers of conflict, contributing to the rise and spread of terrorism in Africa, and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons across the Sahara, the Sahel and the Lake Chad region. This is exacerbated by drug and human trafficking, and mercenaries roaming along the ungovernable spaces or the 'anti-sovereign spaces', pushing the arc of conflict beyond the confines of the Sahel, Lake Chad and the Sahara belt, down to the Horn and Eastward of the continent, meandering toward the South as far as Mozambique. Thus, external intervention, far from creating stability in Libya, has exacerbated conflict and further destabilized the region.

In the Sahel-Sahara region, several militant groups, including Ansar Eddine (headed by Iyad Ag Ghaly), Mourabitoun (headed by Moukhtar Bel Mokhtar), Macina Brigade (headed by Mohammad Koufa), and AQIM (headed by Abdelmalek Droukdel) have merged and are now known as *Jama 'at al Musrat al Islam Wal Muslimeen* (support of Islam and Musleem)-JNIM, with Ghaly as their new Emir. According to ACSRT reports, "with Ghaly, Al Qaeda strategy in consolidating terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa is now complete through the domestication of identifying, recruiting and empowering representatives of local tribes to ensure ownership of the global Al Qaeda agenda" [19, 20]. Meanwhile upon the killing of Abdelmalek Droukdel, the former head of AQIM, in June 2020 by the French forces in Mali, AQIM has appointed Abu Ubaida Yasu al nnabi (Yazid Mubarak) as its new Emir. The ACSRT has warned that countries within the area of operation of these militant and violent extremist groups, like Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, "need to be extra vigilant so as to prevent any complex attacks that may be authorised by the new leader" [21]. In West Africa, the death of Shekau which was thought might lead to the break out of intra-fighting between Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa (ISWA) has instead provided a united front between the two factions which are now working together to confront the Nigerian state. Unfortunately, the merger has suffered

some setbacks as both leaders of ISWAP (Abarnawe) and Boko Haram (Shekau) have been eliminated in leadership tussles. Thus, the insurgents have either been weakened or they could use the occasion to recuperate in order to bounce back with strong leadership command to confront the Nigerian security. Whatever the case, the Nigerian military must prove itself capable to tackle unforeseeable challenges.

The United States recently withdrew from Afghanistan in an abrupt manner. Is there any lesson learned from the abrupt withdrawal and does this portend an end of western global intervention? This is not likely to be so, because while global intervention by western powers might be declining, intervention in Africa might continue because Africa is a soft target intervention spot. Intervention might continue due to reasons adumbrated in this paper.

### **3.9 CHALLENGES OF CONTINUED INTERVENTION**

The growing weakness of the state in Africa has made it possible for the rise of terrorism and insurgency to become a norm, and for foreign intervention to become a permanent project in Africa. Even so, foreign intervention may not be the answer to the challenges inherent in the stateship of Africa. France, the archetype of intervention policy in Africa, is becoming weary of the consequences of continued intervention, and thus contemplates downsizing its troops in Operation Serve and Barkhane. Yet countries on the arc of conflict, though also growing weary of France's hegemonic influence, lack the capacity to take unilateral decision against France. The overwhelming monopolistic characteristics of Operations Serve and Barkhane have not succeeded in effectually ending the war on terrorism. This frustrating reality lends terrorists the upper hand to carry out their attacks in Chad, Niger and Burkina Faso. This is increasing the spread of instability and conflict on the continent. In addition, France cannot claim that withdrawing would be a disservice to Africa. As Kwesi Aning points out, France's withdrawal could provide opportunity for Russia and her mercenaries to step in and expand their interest in the region. This could, in fact, be more hurtful to Europe and her US allies than they anticipate.

Though the United States had, under President Donald Trump, threatened to withdraw her troops in Niger and other parts of the Sahel region, this decision was revised by President Joseph Biden. In 2021, President Biden reminded Congress of the importance of deploying US military personnel to Lake Chad and the Sahel, among other regions, in support of counter terrorism efforts. He informed Congress that "in many of these locations, the security environment is such that United States military personnel may be required to defend themselves against threats or attacks, and, to that end, the United States may deploy United States military personnel with weapons and other appropriate equipment for force protection" [22]. The

USA has an approximate 808 US military personnel deployed to counter the rising threats of Islamic State and Al Qaeda affiliated terrorist groups in the Magheb. Thus, despite the challenges, external intervention is likely to persist as long as the state in Africa remains weak, and unable to effectively tackle rising terrorism and insurgency.

In terms of building an internal capacity for intervention, Nigeria has failed to fill the gap because of a lack of what Kwesi Aning called “sophisticated leadership.” Indeed, while we might need a benign hegemon on the subcontinent, who should take such a lead remains the question as internal challenges and regional politics have hampered countries like Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal. Nigeria, in particular, has continued to face the dilemma of its internal contradictions. No doubt, the Nigerian military is capable of dealing with the threat of insurgency, but the deeply embedded and sharply divided domestic cleavages that have also penetrated its military undermine its potential strength. Unfortunately, too, its pride would not allow for the deployment of UN/AU peace-keepers for fear that the latter might turn the country into an occupied territory of foreign powers.

While Nigeria remains too preoccupied with internal challenges to rise to the position of benign hegemon, the fall of another potential pan-state leader, Idris Deby, has had serious ramifications for both internal and external intervention. The exit of the “authoritarian democrat” Idris Derby, a strong ally of France, has weakened France’s domineering influence in the region. Derby was assassinated mysteriously while confronting Chadian rebels in the Northern part of the country. With Derby, a protégé of France, out of the way, the rebels’ interests have gained a stronghold within the arc of conflict. This has tremendous effect on French counterterrorism measures. While the succession of Derby by his son was unconstitutional, nevertheless, for the sake of France, neither the African Union nor the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has suspended Chad from its membership, choosing to tolerate the military leadership of General Mahamat Derby who replaced his father, which continues the legacy of imperial linkage with the west. Similarly, with the death of Shekau in the Lake Chad region, ISWAP and Al Qaeda in the Maghreb, along with their allies, have become emboldened with the latitude to float across the ungovernable space from Mauritania to the Sahel. France is finding it difficult to counter their movements, particularly since its strong ally, Field Marshall Idris Derby, is no longer there to undermine the activities of the terrorists. Towards the Horn and down to Mozambique, Al-Shaaba and Ansur have continued to wreak havoc to the extent that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMIS) and the Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC) have not been able to effectively contain them.

The fractured nature of the African state makes it difficult for her to cope in a way that external intervention

would be rendered unnecessary. And as Kwesi Aning noted, external intervention is becoming a permanent phenomenon. With enormous resources on the continent, external powers cannot afford to stay off the continent, in spite of growing opposition to western intervention, and given the unprepared withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan. It is not unimaginable that intervention has been used by foreign powers as a false front, behind which to mine the resources of the region. In the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the perennial presence of western interests has been smeared by conflict, and indeed viewed by some as a pretense for resource mining rather than peacebuilding. Given the lure of the continent’s resources, any threat of withdrawal is hollow, for it seems that the western European world can hardly survive without Africa. Howard Nicholas [23], at the International Institute of Social Studies, succinctly recapped Francois Mitterrand’s assertion that France cannot do without Africa. In his words (albeit very arrogantly stated):

Africa . . . has been fundamental to the global prosperity of the advanced countries. And Africa had a role to play, it has a role as a raw material producer. We will not allow sub-Saharan Africa to escape that. We will do everything to keep sub-Saharan Africa where it is. It is absolutely vital to the prosperity of everyone else. So, let’s get clear about that. This means we need these raw materials and we need them. That is the message. All the economic structure, all the global institutions and the economics we teach everyone, is all designed to keep Africa exactly where it is. And whether it’s EU or the US or now China, it is always the same. We need Africa to be impoverished because we need them. That’s the message . . . if Africa does something different, I assure you [the] living standard of all those in Europe, and North America and Asia is going to fall. And that’s a big price to be paid. I assure you that the West is not going to allow that without a big fight [23].

To sustain this global prosperity, Nicholas claims that the west, being the primary producer of ideology, deploys its intellectuals to study the continent as a failed or collapsed state with enormous rhetoric, to convince “Africa to keep doing what they are doing. Tell them, it is your job that you are poor” [23]. Though Nicholas is not saying anything new, he seems to be one of the few western scholars that have openly acknowledged this position. It is a known fact that the Bretton Woods institutions have chunked out several ideological policies that have reinvigorated underdevelopment, made the continent prone to conflict, corruption, a smeared elections and bad governance. so that the intervention project will remain a norm. Unfortunately, Africa’s attempts to resolve its conflicts are beset with impossibilities. While one conflict is being resolved, another one is emerging, becoming far too difficult for any internal efforts by regional organisations like ECOWAS, or

SADC and /or the African Union to resolve. Inevitably the west is called upon to mobilize under the pretext of the UNSC intervention. It is no wonder that conflict keeps replicating and duplicating, unresolvably, in Africa.

The international community needs to tackle the challenges that external intervention poses to Africa. One remarkable point that the UN continues to make about counterterrorism is the need for a comprehensive approach to deal with the challenges of economic growth, promote good governance, reduce poverty, build state capacity, improve social services and fight corruption. However, it has not addressed two challenges: the question of leadership corruption that deepens democratic decay in Africa; and the failure to interrogate the ideological context that breeds terrorism.

The practice of democracy in Africa is dominated by corrupt politicians; and yet the western world emphasizes democracy and strong institutions as the basis to deepen democracy. The question is, is there no alternative to democracy? If the current system is not making progress, there needs to be an alternative system. It is unrealistic to expect corrupt leaders to deepen democracy when they are contributing to the problem of democracy. Might it be possible and beneficial to allow a good or corrective coup to take place, for about 6 to 12 months, in order to repair the damage that politicians have committed? Mali's example seems to support this.<sup>3</sup> While this solution may not go down well with the western world, yet it is believed that a constitutionally-guaranteed military intervention could be a viable alternative for a state that is on the verge of collapse. However, the danger lies in distinguishing a constitutionally-guaranteed military intervention aimed at saving democracy from a regime-change military rule (as was experienced when genuine African leaders, like Patrice Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah and Thomas Sankara, and recently Muammar Gaddafi, among others, were overthrown with the assistance of imperial powers like Belgium, the US and France). The concept of constitutionally-guaranteed military intervention in politics is a way of fashioning and nurturing African-type democratic civil-military relations, and one that could address the challenges of political corruption<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> Democratic governance has been stunted in Africa and in Mali in particular. This is as a result of corruption, heightened security threats by insurgents and other criminalities. The failure of civil regime to address these challenges has led to several coup attempts and military rule in Mali.

<sup>4</sup> The idea of constitutionally guaranteed military rule is not one that may appeal to western democracies. The idea however stems from the dismal failure of most African nations in implementing western style democracy (migrated social structure). Whereas western democracies were consolidated within a period of 200 - 500 years or more, Africa's democracy is emerging. African nations may not seek to reinvent the wheel of democracy, and yet we are not doing well with the model parceled to Africa. To succeed, democracy must be based on cultural proclivities of nations with their own folkways, rather than be embodied with European cultural transfer. Because African politicians have failed in nurturing democracy based on western folkways, Africa should allow certain elements of military oversight of democratic rule for a period of 6 to 12 months, as a strategy to consolidate democratic principles and democratic governance.

The second challenge that needs to be addressed involves the interrogation of what presumes to be some fundamental global best practices in the fight against terrorism. The UN provides four pillars of Global Counter Terrorism Strategy, as follows:

- Addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism
- Providing measures to prevent and combat terrorism
- Providing measures to build state's capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of United Nations system in that regard
- Providing measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism [24].

The question is, how do these pillars deepen our ability to combat and prevent terrorism and violent extremism in Africa? This question is germane based on the fact that the recent patterns of terrorism are ideologically driven, and are often based on the teachings of religious extremism. Because religion could be sentimental rather than rational, the international community finds it difficult to interrogate a type of religious ideology that is at odds with the basic fundamentals of global concerns and interests. When the UN fails to classify religion as a tool which terrorists exploit to conduct their activities, it becomes impossible to question and address the intent of terrorists whose religious fundamentalism pervades the society. It is extremely difficult to deradicalize terrorists without addressing the religious content that facilitates the process of radicalization. The world must take measures to understand what these terrorists actually want, rather than conclude that their ideology is of no consequence. One of the grudges of the terrorists, as expressed by Boko Haram, is their claim that 'western civilisation is evil.' But what or which aspects of western civilisation do they perceive as evil? Can this grudge be addressed in such a way that the drive towards terrorism and extremism can be ameliorated?

It might sound absurd to suggest that the western world should critically address the fundamental grudges of terrorist organisations against western cultural practices, particularly related to dressing, entertainment, sexual orientations and the apparent intolerance of Muslim rights such as the wearing of hijab by women. Indeed, when these practices are propagated and/or mandated within African societies, such only further inspire and embolden extremist ideologies. This compounds the fight against terrorism and is an issue which the international community needs to address effectively. In addition, the western world's current advocacy of its emerging culture, and promulgation of cultural modernisms as 'human rights' may be perceived as

a direct affront to other ideologies. Such emerging cultural rights might be considered ‘extended-rights,’ not to be necessarily confused with ‘human’ rights in texture and context. There is therefore, the need to separate cultural rights from human rights, the distinction of which may settle some of the controversies between progressive western societies and developing nations’ differing ideological stance, rather than creating yet another basis for strengthening terrorism and violent extremism.

#### 4. CONCLUSION

This paper has focused on the critical security paradoxes which have engulfed virtually all parts of Africa, particularly the “arc of instability” where criminal elements operate in ungovernable spaces. One fact that was reiterated very clearly is the perpetual weakness of the state in Africa, which is characterised by corrupt and incompetent political leadership, the declining role of traditional institutions and the often-perceived illegitimacy of civil society groups. The growing weakness of the state in Africa has made it possible for the rise of terrorism and insurgency to become a norm, and for foreign intervention to become a permanent project in Africa. Indeed, the fractured nature of the African state makes it difficult for her to cope in a way that external intervention would be rendered unnecessary. Despite growing opposition to western intervention, the enormous resources of Africa provide strong incentive to perpetuate intervention. Yet, as has also been aptly demonstrated, intervention has proved counterproductive to the cause of stability and development in Africa. In tackling the challenges which external intervention poses to Africa, this paper emphasises two critical issues which may become game changers for the trajectory of the continent. The first has to do with deepening and repairing the foundations of African democracy to introduce indigenous elements and perspectives, rather than wholesale western precepts which have proved unworkable for the continent. The second area is changes in the ideological and cultural approach of the west to Africa in such a manner that would discourage extremism and aid the cause of deradicalization.

#### REFERENCES

1. Kaplan R. *The Coming Anarchy*. The Atlantic. 1994; February Issue.
2. Aning K. *West Africa Security Perspectives: Kwesi Aning Explains*. DIIS Report. 2021:03.
3. Buhari M. *Africa needs more than US military Aid to defeat Terror*. Financial Times London. 2021: 15th August.

4. Ekeh, PP. *Colonialism and Social Structure: An Inaugural Lecture delivered at the University of Ibadan on Thursday, 5 June 1980*. University of Ibadan, Nigeria: 1983.
5. Yoroms, GJ. ‘Regime Security Interests and Nigeria’s Intervention in ECOMOG’ Dissertation ABU Zaria, Nigeria. 2002.
6. Ibeanu O. ‘Oil Environment and conflict in the Coastal Zone of West Africa’. In: Okechukwu Ibeanu and Jibrin Ibrahim (eds) *Beyond Resource Violence: civil source and the challenges of peacebuilding in West Africa*. Centre for Democratic and Development, Abuja, Nigeria. 2009.
7. Palan, R. ‘Crime, Sovereignty and the Offshore World’. In: H. Richard Fireman (ed) *Crime and the Global Political Economy*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner; 2009.
8. Goita M. *Securing the Sahel*. African Defence Forum. 2011; Volume 4 Quarter 3.
9. Abdullahi A. *US votes \$100m to fight terrorism in Nigeria*. 2005 May 30; DailyTrust; Abuja, Nigeria.
10. United Nations Security Council. ‘Arc of Instability’ across Africa, If Left Unchecked, Could Turn Continent into Launch Pad for Larger-Scale Terrorist Attacks, Security Council Told. Department of Public Information: News and Media Division NY 6965<sup>th</sup> meeting. 2013 May 13; SC/11004.
11. Mazrui A. *The Africans: A Triple Heritage Reader*. Toronto: Little, Brown & Company; 1986.
12. Martins G. *Continuity and change in Franco-African Relations*. The Journal of Modern African Studies. 1995 November 11; 33 (1).
13. Shipway M. *Decolonization and Its Impact; A Comparative Approach to the End of Colonial Empires*. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishers; 2005.
14. Koutouini MR. *14 African Countries Forced by France to Pay Colonial Tax for the Benefits of Slavery and Colonization*. SiliconAfrica. 2014 January 28; Available from: [http://siliconafrika.com/france-colonial-tax/?utm\\_content=buffer8680a&utm\\_medium=social&utm\\_source=twitter.com&utm\\_campaign=buffer](http://siliconafrika.com/france-colonial-tax/?utm_content=buffer8680a&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer)
15. DW. *Africa and France: An unfulfilled Dream of Independence?* 2020 August 3; African Independence <https://www.dw.com/en/africa-and-france-an-unfulfilled-dream-of-independence/a-54418511>
16. African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT). *French colonial tax still enforce for Africa*. World Bulletin. 2015 January 4; Available at: <https://worldbulletin.dunyabulteni.net/africa/french-colonial-tax-still-enforce-for-africa-h152967.html>
17. Sylla NS. *The CFA Franc: French Monetary Imperialism in Africa* [Blog]. World of Clever Blogging. 2017 July 12. Available at: <http://www.topuniversities.com>
18. Hundeyin D. *The “French Colonial Tax”: A misleading heuristic for understanding Francafrrique*. Nigeria; The Africa Report; 2019 November 21. Available at: <https://www.theafricareport.com/20326/the-french-colonial-tax-a-misleading-heuristic-for-understanding-francafrrique/>
19. African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT). *African Union Preliminary Report on the Merger of Terrorist groups in Mali*. Algeria; 2017 March 8.
20. Le Roux P. *Responding to the Rise in Violent Extremism in the Sahel*. African Security Brief. 2019 December 2; No. 36.
21. African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT). *African Union Preliminary Report: Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Appoints a New Leader*. 2020 November 21.
22. Biden J. *Letter to the Speaker of the US House and President Pro Tempore of the Senate Regarding the War Powers Report*. Whitehouse. 2021 June 8.
23. Nicholas H. *The Hague: International Institute of Social Studies*. *Underdevelopment in Africa -What’s real Story part— (1-3)*. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v3x10/>; *What are the root causes of Underdevelopment in Africa?* Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=06FSI>; *What is the role of trade and institution like IMF?* Available at [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qG\\_MLs46lpo](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qG_MLs46lpo); 2015 October 14.
24. Rosand E, Millar A, Ipe J. *Civil Society and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Opportunities and Challenges*. Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation. New York. 2008 September.